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ISSUES IN SCHOOL LABOR RELATIONS
MARVIN J. GLINK*
The policy of the federal government and most state governments
for more than a quarter of a century has been to encourage and protect
the development of collective bargaining in private employment by
laws such as the Wagner Act,' the Taft-Hartley Act,2 and comparable
state statutes. Only recently has a similar trend developed in the public
sector. The reason for the new trend is that public employment today
is one of the fastest growing sectors of our economy.3 The result of this
explosive growth in public sector employees has been an increased con-
cern with all matters affecting the relationship between public employ-
ees and their employers, including collective bargaining and the right
to strike.
Each year, more and more public employees seek to influence the
operation of public schools in Illinois. The attorney who represents
school districts in such instances must acquire expertise in not only
public sector labor relations law, but also the techniques of organized
employee negotiations. These negotiations involve numerous complex
issues. For example, there is the question as to whether a school board
has a duty to "recognize" its employees in a formal bargaining unit or
whether it has the right to refuse to recognize them. Other issues con-
cern the scope of negotiations, the substance of the labor contract, and
policies regarding grievance solving. Also, the negotiators must pro-
vide procedures for handling strikes and concerted slow downs. Fur-
thermore, consideration must be given to the issues of federal and state
intervention, discrimination and employment security.
In order to represent a school district successfully, the attorney
must understand the ramifications of these and other questions. Thor-
ough preparation is essential, as well as a complete understanding of
* Partner, Ancel, Glink, Diamond & Murphy. B.S., University of Illinois; LL.B., Chicago-
Kent College of Law.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
3. Since 1950, public sector employment has almost quadrupled and is currently at a level of
more than 15 million. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Jan. 1978). Membership in public employee unions likewise is expanding and is
reported to exceed five million. PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES (2d ed. 1976).
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various labor negotiation techniques. Above all, the attorney must se-
cure the cooperation of an informed school board and administration.
This article will provide an overview of these problems and the com-
plex subjects with which an attorney involved in public school em-
ployee negotiations will be confronted.
PUBLIC V. PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
An important difference between employment in the public and
private sectors is that private employees have the right to strike,
whereas in some states, such as Illinois, this right is not accorded to
public employees. 4 Additionally, private labor negotiations are influ-
enced and regulated by various devices often not found in the public
sector: the duty imposed on the parties to bargain in good faith; state
and federal agencies that resolve issues of representation, and enforce
and protect employee and management rights; mediation services;
grievance procedures such as binding arbitration; the exclusion of su-
pervisory, managerial and confidential employees from the bargaining
unit; and exclusive majority representation chosen by the employees.
Another major difference between public and private labor forces
is that decisions in the private sector are primarily motivated by eco-
nomics, whereas public labor concerns are inevitably entangled in
politics. Thus, decisions regarding wages, hours, and conditions of em-
ployment for public employees are more politically motivated than
economic. This is partly due to the fact that public employee organiza-
tions have the political power to influence their members' voting
choices. Such leverage often enables public employees to secure above
average wages and benefits through negotiations.
Like other elected officials, school board members generally are
concerned with re-election, and they recognize the vote potential of the
public employee group. Employee organizations understand this polit-
ical reality, and have gone to great lengths to maximize their influence
over the votes of their members. Teacher organizations sometimes in-
volve their members both in school board and municipal elections.
However, in many instances, the bulk of the employees do not live
within the public body that employs them. Often an attempt by these
employees to politic in the election of the public body will fail since
they are viewed as outsiders and non-taxpayers.
Elected board officials also must consider public attitudes and re-
4. See text accompanying notes 42-51 infra.
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actions. For example, they must measure potential resistance to higher
taxes, and whether public sympathies lie with the school board or the
labor union. Another consideration is the extent and slant of news cov-
erage, which subtly affects public and political pressures on the process
of negotiations.
Such distinctions create unique problems in the public sector.
Negotiators must consider the extent of minority employee organiza-
tion rights, the length of time a bargaining contract can cover, and
whether such an agreement can be made retroactive. Furthermore,
school board representatives must determine the effect of budget dead-
lines on negotiations, and the relationship between teacher tenure laws
and grievance solving. Finally, the school board must establish its poli-
cies regarding such issues as union security agreements and binding
arbitration.
One other important distinction between public versus private em-
ployment is that the government has the capability of raising revenues
in order to meet its contractual obligations. If revenues increase be-
cause of labor contracts and this results in higher taxes, there is greater
probability that taxpayers will become involved in the labor negotiat-
ing process.
FEDERAL AND STATE INVOLVEMENT
In 1967, an Illinois advisory commission on labor-management
policy for public employees recommended that "legislation defining
state policy with regard to the rights and responsibilities of public em-
ployers and employees is imperative and in the public interest." 5 The
commission stated that for more than thirty years, Congress, as a mat-
ter of national policy, has granted employees in private industry the
right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. The
report emphasized the expansion of public employment and the fact
that public employees have a real interest in their own economic well-
being and the conditions under which they are employed. The com-
mission recommended that legislative guidelines be adopted immedi-
ately and that public bodies conduct in-service training programs in
employee relations and management procedures.
While the commission's excellent efforts have not yet even resulted
in legislation in Illinois, the battle continues to be fought each year in
the legislature. As statistics emerge from those states with mandatory
5. [1967] GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS.
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bargaining laws, the picture becomes clouded and the wisdom of legis-
lation becomes increasingly unclear.
One reason suggested for the needed state legislation is the grow-
ing intrusion by the federal government upon state sovereignty, includ-
ing the proposed establishment of a federal system for the control of
public employer-employee relations, and the expanded coverage of
such pervasive laws as the Fair Labor Standards Act6 and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.
7
The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 has
sparked a profusion of decisions and complex administrative regula-
tions in areas previously free of governmental intervention.9 A school
board now finds it must provide certain procedural steps if it wishes to
discharge many of its non-civil service employees. Further, statutory
procedures employed in discharge cases, even under tenure laws, are
being challenged. In the area of employment, new guidelines which
seek to prevent discrimination present a board of education with many
new problems and obstacles. Given the propensities of our legislatures,
a board of education may face more governmental intervention in
forthcoming years.10
RECOGNITION
It is clear that public employees are entitled to organize and join
labor organizations;I t indeed, this right is protected under the Civil
6. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1940), as amended by Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
9. In 1972, the Civil Rights Act was amended to extend Title VII to state and local govern-
ment. In another expansion of Title VII provisions, new equal employment opportunity guide-
lines are now published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council.
10. However, the validity of such legislation has been dealt a serious blow by the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
While this case specifically invalidates the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, it
also raises serious constitutional questions concerning how far the federal government can intrude
into state and local matters.
11. Historically, a sovereign was prohibited from negotiating with its servant regarding any
aspect of employment. This prohibition was based upon the theory that such negotiations neces-
sarily would involve an unlawful governmental delegation of authority or a surrender of public
property, which would constitute discrimination against the public in favor of public employees
and their labor organizations.
Following this line of reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1917 upheld the right of the
Chicago Board of Education to prohibit its teachers from joining a union. Fursman v. City of
Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917). See also United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741
(1946); Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946). Furthermore, Illinois is
one of the few states that has not adopted legislation giving municipal employees the right to
engage in collective bargaining.
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Rights Act of 1871.12 More specifically, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that teachers and other school
district employees are no different from other public employees, and
have a constitutional right to join a union.' 3 The right of employees to
organize is not restricted to unions whose membership is limited to
public employees. One can assume that school district employees
would join the movement toward some type of concerted organization.
The state of labor-management relations will strongly affect the
potential for successful organization. But even where good relations
exist between employers and employees, often labor will still want a
written contract delineating all rights and duties of the parties. Like
most workers, school teachers want greater involvement and leverage
in the school board's management decisions.'
4
In 1945, Illinois Governor Dwight H. Green vetoed Senate Bill No. 427, which would have
made it permissible for the state and its political subdivisions to bargain and enter into collective
bargaining agreements. The governor was of the opinion that the matters embraced in the legisla-
tion were solely within the control and regulatory power of the Illinois General Assembly. Since
1945, a bill promoting public employee collective bargaining has been introduced at each Illinois
legislative session except in 1959. The language of subsequent bills has remained practically the
same. In all cases, the legislation would have required the state, public corporations, educational
institutions and other bodies politic to enter into collective bargaining agreements with employees,
through their representatives, respecting wages, hours, conditions of employment, and other bene-
fits, as long as these agreements contained a stipulation prohibiting strikes or lockouts.
However, even without any statutory guidelines, Illinois has evolved a piecemeal approach to
developing local government labor relations through attorney general opinions, court decisions,
and local policies. The appellate court of Illinois effectively has avoided the state legislature's
reluctance to sanction collective bargaining in the public sector. The appellate court's position
directly opposes the earlier view that collective bargaining by public employees is illegal without
prior legislative authority. (In 1934, Illinois Attorney General Otto Kerner, in an opinion (File
No. 642), stated that a school board did not have the legal power to enter into a contract with a
collective bargaining agent, and that "each contract with a teacher is a personal and separate
matter and should be entered into with the individual teacher.") In Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ.
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966), the court held that specific
legislation is necessary only to prohibit, not to authorize, collective bargaining by public employ-
ees. The court stated that the board of education is the best judge of the most efficient method of
arriving at the terms of employment and that the court is without authority to deny the board's
exercise of discretion in choosing the method. The court went on to state that a collective bargain-
ing agreement does not necessarily result in an unlawful delegation of the board's discretion to the
collective bargaining agent. The court implied that it would only prohibit "the Board's entry into
any collective bargaining agreement which could result in any delegation of its statutory powers
or duties." Id at 466, 222 N.E.2d at 248 (quoting defendant's brief). Thus, the case effectively
opened the door for units of local government to negotiate collective bargaining contracts should
they so desire.
Finally, Governor Daniel Walker issued an executive order on November 6, 1973, granting
state employees the right to engage in collective negotiations. However, that proclamation has no
effect on employees hired by, and working for, a municipality or a school district.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v.
Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
13. Norbeck v. Davenport Community School Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir. 1976).
14. In some respects, management must be neutral, especially during the process of organiza-
tion. It may, however, attempt to propagandize for the status quo and it also may see that or-
ganizing is conducted in an honest manner which does not interfere with school district
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While school employees can organize, the board may refuse to
bargain with the labor organization. In Illinois, there is no statutory
obligation imposed on a school board to recognize employee unions.
Any school board that refuses to recognize and bargain with a union is
aided by the fact that Illinois public employees have no constitutional
or statutory right to strike or refuse to provide services to units of local
government. While school employee organization appears inevitable,
the school district should consider several matters before it decides to
grant recognition to a union.
Most important is the bargaining unit; that is, the group of em-
ployees represented by the recognized bargaining agent and covered by
the bargaining contract. The negotiating parties may determine the
unit's definition in the bargaining process in any way they wish, and
this becomes a critical clause in the contract. The provision outlining
the perimeters of the bargaining unit should be sufficiently precise to
allow easy determination of those covered and those excluded by the
contract. t-5
Generally, the employees are represented by the union or associa-
tion, which accepts the duty to fairly represent all unit members,
whether or not they are members of the union. With the exception of a
few contract clauses that concern the exclusive rights of the union itself,
all contract terms embrace all unit members, regardless of union mem-
bership or lack of it.
The breadth of the bargaining unit is limited by the desirability of
a community of interest. That is, all unit members should be affected
by, and concerned with, substantially similar conditions that give the
members parallel interests. There is little problem here with respect to
teachers. Most districts are also willing to consider, as within the
teacher community, related occupations such as guidance counselors,
reading consultants, librarians, psychologists, social workers and
audio-visual personnel.
t6
Because of the different roles that employees perform in public
service, multi-bargaining units are probably inevitable. Therefore, a
school board's decision to grant recognition should be made con-
operations. This latter responsibility generally requires supervising elections between competing
locals and assuring employees that they will not be unfairly coerced during an organizing effort.
15. Both existing and potential administrative personnel should, of course, be excluded from
the unit. The language to accomplish this is often controversial, as is the inclusion or exclusion of
department chairpersons who have evaluative responsibilities.
16. Most school districts also accept nurses in the teacher unit, although some exclude those
who are not certified as teachers. It is desirable in most instances to exclude substitutes and
teacher aides from this unit.
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sciously and with the knowledge that there may be dual negotiations
among school employees and that these negotiations are going to be
time consuming. The available dollars will have to be allocated to the
various bargaining units with the recognition that certain units are go-
ing to require benefits which cannot be given to all employees. This
often leads to the situation where competing bargaining units attempt
to outdo each other.'
7
Other important considerations that affect the decision to recog-
nize are the scope of bargaining, the exclusion of supervisory person-
nel,' 8 budget and statutory limitations, the enforcement of good faith
bargaining, the right of the public to know details of the negotiations,
the extent of the authority of the public negotiator, impasse procedures,
strikes, and rights of individual employees.
SCOPE OF BARGAINING
The end result of the negotiating process is a written agreement
between the parties. Before there is an initial contract, all of the rights
to establish working conditions and operate the schools rest with the
school board. The process of negotiation by its very nature erodes the
complete authority of management. Therefore, it becomes important
to determine at the outset what is negotiable. Put in its simplest terms,
to what extent is the school board willing to give up its right to direct
the work force in order to maintain d6tente with its employees?
Just as the school board has total discretion as to whether to par-
ticipate at all in collective bargaining, 19 the board may determine the
scope of the negotiations. There is no statute that requires that any
particular matters be submitted to the bargaining process. The more
limited the contract scope, the easier it will be to negotiate terms, and
the less restrictions will be placed on the board's authority and actions.
Furthermore, once the boundaries of negotiations are defined,
there is no obligation to discuss issues beyond those perimeters. The
board should not negotiate matters unrelated to the labor-management
relationship, such as educational policy issues of curriculum and text-
17. In considering the bargaining unit to be organized and recognized, regional bargaining
may be a feasible alternative. A number of school boards may want to negotiate as a unit where
they perceive they have mutual problems.
18. In Norbeck v. Davenport Community School Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 68 (8th Cir. 1976), the
court ruled that a principal and other supervisory personnel may be excluded from a bargaining
unit.
19. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
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book selection-issues which are appropriately left to the realm of
teachers.
Basically, there are three approaches to the question of scope. One
is to remain silent on the subject and allow anything to be negotiated.
The scope of the contract is thereby defined by the ultimate agreement.
Another approach is to limit negotiations to salaries, fringe benefits,
hours and working conditions. Obviously, such a definition allows
much leeway as to the meaning of these terms and consequently the
breadth of the defined negotiations. For example, a question that fre-
quently arises is whether class size is a working condition. 20 Generally,
a union will attempt to include in the scope of bargaining matters con-
cerning hiring, transfer, promotion, assignment, discipline and dis-
charge of employees. 2' The board should refuse to negotiate these
matters, since they inhere in the board's management functions.22 A
third approach to the scope of bargaining is to restrict negotiations to a
fixed number of items, such as the union's right to use district build-
ings, dues checkoff, and transfer procedures. This avoids some of the
questions raised above, but many of these specific terms still must be
defined. The use of such specifics also tends to magnify the contractual
expectations of the union on these points.
UNION SECURITY
The issue of unioif security evokes emotional arguments from both
sides of the bargaining table. To the union, union security means the
20. Strong arguments can be made on both sides of this issue: On the one hand, the number
of students to be taught can be said to have a significant impact upon teachers (at least in extreme
situations), while on the other, the determination of the teacher/pupil ratio is perhaps the most
fundamental policy determination, both financially and educationally, that is made by a board of
education. In this sense the issue of class size ought to be reserved to the sole authority of the
board. A Wisconsin court recently held that class size is not negotiable, for it is a policy determi-
nation. At the same time, the court said the impact of class size on teachers is negotiable. Beloit
Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 64, 242 N.W.2d 231,
241 (1976). Thus, presumably, the board can set class size at any level it desires, but it might be
compelled to negotiate, at least under the Wisconsin statute or under language equivalent thereto
in a contract, what compensation or other adjustments have to be made when class size or stu-
dent/teacher ratio reaches a certain level.
21. An emerging area of conflict as to "terms and conditions of employment" is whether
teachers who have expertise in a particular area, such as athletics, can be required to supervise
extracurricular activities.
22. This is to be distinguished from the necessity on occasion to negotiate procedures inci-
dent to these basic functions (aside from almost any aspect of hiring which may be said to be
outside the reach of the agreement, since it deals with people before they become members of the
bargaining unit). Thus, it is inappropriate to bargain the board's right to transfer an employee,
but it may agree as part of a transfer procedure to prescribe a form of notice to the employee who
is to be transferred and/or to allow a conference under certain circumstances. The distinction
between procedure and substance is critical and should be maintained whenever possible.
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,enhancement of the union's financial position and bargaining strength.
It appears that public sector unions will push in the next several years
for a number of important concessions in the union security area.
The most important forms of union security are maintenance of
membership, union shop, closed shop, agency shop, and dues checkoff.
Maintenance of membership, a provision often found in trade union
contracts, requires that once an employee becomes a member of the
union, he must continue his membership in the union as a condition of
continued employment.
The union shop requires that employees be members of the union
and that new employees join within a specified period, or be subject to
discharge. This form of union security generally is recognized in the
private sector. The closed shop requires that before an employer can
hire someone for a position within the bargaining unit, the prospective
employee must become a member ef the union. The closed shop gener-
ally is illegal in both the private and public sectors, especially since the
passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. The agency shop re-
quires that an employee who is not a dues-paying member of the union
must pay to the union a fee, usually the equivalent of the dues. The
validity of this arrangement has been held constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court for both the private and public sectors, provided
that the unions refund a portion of the dues or fees used for non-collec-
tive bargaining purposes. 2
3
The dues checkoff serves to provide the union with a substantial
degree of financial stability. A contract usually provides that upon re-
ceipt of a written authorization from an employee, the employer will
deduct the union dues and remit it to the union. The Illinois School





An inherent part of the bargaining agreement is the grievance pro-
23. The issue was settled in the public sector in the case of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977) in the same manner as the private sector. The Michigan Bargaining Statute au-
thorized agency shops. It should be noted that the Court was sharply divided.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-21.1 (1977) provides:
The board shall, upon the written request of a teacher, withhold from the compensation
of that teacher the membership dues of such teacher payable to any professional teach-
ers' organization. Under such arrangement, an amount shall be withheld from each reg-
ular payroll period which is equal to the pro rata share of the annual membership dues
and the board shall pay such withholding to the specified professional organization.
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cedure, a mechanism usually provided by the agreement for resolving
apparently irreconcilable differences of contract interpretation. Such a
procedure is designed to resolve an impasse while minimizing expenses
and ill feelings between the parties.
The grievance procedure must outline what constitutes a griev-
ance. It should limit the definition to alleged violations of the agree-
ment in order to restrict the scope of negotiations. Furthermore, the
procedure should provide for an orderly sequence of steps from the
administrator's initial decision to the final disposition, allowing enough
time for requisite grievance meetings and preparation of appropriate
responses. There are three basic methods for resolving an impasse: ar-
bitration, mediation and fact finding. A more recent approach involves
a referendum vote.
Arbitration
Generally, the ultimate step in the grievance procedure is arbitra-
tion, a method of settling employment disputes through recourse to an
impartial third party whose findings may be either advisory or binding,
depending upon the contract.25 In grievance arbitration, where the
neutral party's impact is merely advisory, the arbitrator is used to inter-
pret the contract and determine the intent of the parties, according to
the contract language, history, and past practice. In binding arbitra-
tion, the impartial third party in effect construes the terms of the agree-
ment.
In Illinois, even if the parties are willing to submit to arbitration,
the question remains as to whether a school board may delegate its
authority to a third party. Numerous cases have held that a public
body has certain governmental powers, usually delegated by the legis-
lature or the Illinois Constitution, 26 and cannot delegate these powers
to others, but must exercise them as a corporate body.27 Various Illi-
nois courts have held that a board of education cannot delegate matters
of discretion vested in it by statute to a third party.28
However, by agreeing to negotiate a contract, the public body is
25. The usual procedure found in contracts is for each party to the contract to appoint one
person to an arbitration panel. The two parties then choose a third person and, if they cannot
agree, some procedure is established for selecting a third person. Frequent use is made of the
American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation Service. (The number of federal
mediators available for this type of activity is extremely limited.)
26. There is an exception here for home rule municipalities.
27. See, e.g., Stevens, Arbirabiliy and.the Illinois Courts, 31 ARB. J. I, 1-25 (1976).
28. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286
(1972).
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not surrendering its decision-making authority, since the final decision
as to the terms and conditions of employment still rests solely with the
legislative body. In the case of Board of Education v. Johnson,29 an
Illinois appellate court considered two issues that a union sought to
have construed through binding arbitration. One issue concerned a
school board's decision to transfer a teacher and its refusal to assign her
to an open class at the school at which she had previously taught. Sec-
ondly, certain teachers complained that they were required to do cleri-
cal work by writing students' names on monthly attendance cards,
contrary to the terms of an existing agreement between the union and
the board of education. The union sought to have the disputes arbi-
trated, and subsequently an arbitrator rendered a decision favorable to
the teachers. The board of education filed suit to nullify both arbitra-
tion actions and the trial court held that neither grievance was arbitra-
ble. The Illinois appellate court reviewed the history of arbitration in
Illinois, as well as decisions in other jurisdictions. The majority in
Johnson did not believe that all disputes were proper subjects for bind-
ing arbitration. However, the court said that "arbitration of certain
'minor' disputes pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not
constitute a delegation by the board, and we believe they should be
submitted to binding arbitration in the event of impasse."
'30
The Johnson court concluded that "minor" disputes were those
that did not contravene the school code or the Illinois Arbitration
Act.31 Therefore, the court determined that the teacher assignment
could not be arbitrated, but that the second grievance was a minor dis-
pute that could have been submitted to arbitration. Thus, the court
upheld the award of the arbitrator in that case.
Such cases as Johnson appear to revolve around what remedy the
arbitrator can provide. Meanwhile, two recent appellate court cases in-
volving the failure to arbitrate the dismissal of a non-tenured teacher
have reiterated the rule that a school board cannot delegate its vested
discretionary powers to another party even through a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 32
29. 21 111. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Johnson].
30. Id at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641.
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (1977) states:
A written agreement to submit an existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a
written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
32. Lockport Area Special Educ. Cooperatfie v. Lockport Area Special Educ. Cooperative
Ass'n, 33 Ill. App. 3d 789, 338 N.E.2d 463 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Christensen, 30 I11. App. 3d
696, 332 N.E.2d 482 (1975).
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In 1976, the question of whether there could be any binding arbi-
tration provisions in a bargaining contract finally reached the Illinois
Supreme Court. Board of Trustees v. Cook County Teachers Union, Lo-
cal 160033 concerned the issue of whether an arbitrator may award
teaching contracts to non-tenured junior college teachers whose con-
tracts were not renewed without prior faculty evaluation and recom-
mendation called for by the collective bargaining agreement. The
court referred to an earlier decision, Illinois Education Association Local
District 218 v. Board of Education,34 relating to the power of a board of
education to dismiss probationary teachers, and said: "We adhere to
our position there stated in [Illinois Education Association] that the
Board's duties in appointing teachers are nondelegable, and it follows
therefrom that the arbitrator is without authority to award an employ-
ment contract as a remedy for the violation of a collective binding
agreement.
35
The Local 1600 court further stated that the matter of faculty pro-
motions is a nondelegable power which cannot be required to be arbi-
trated,36 nor can promotions be subject to binding arbitration.
3 7
However, in the final aspect of the case, involving the question of an
arbitrator's back pay award for summer school teachers, the defendant
board did not raise the issue of nondelegability. The court stated that
there was "[no] problem on this ground with the binding agreement to
allocate extra teaching assignments in an equitable fashion, for the
Board retains the authority to select extra courses and to offer rota-
tional employment only to teachers it has determined to be qualified to
teach the offered courses." 38 The court then found the back pay awards
lawful. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court has approved a very limited
form of binding arbitration.
39
33. 62 Ill. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Local 1600]. The first
issue discussed was whether an arbitrator may award teaching contracts to non-tenured junior
college teachers whose contracts were not renewed without prior faculty evaluation and recom-
mendation called for by the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 473, 343 N.E.2d at 474.
34. 62 Ill. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1976).
35. Id at 476, 343 N.E.2d at 476.
36. Id at 477-78, 343 N.E.2d at 477.
37. Id at 478-79, 343 N.E.2d at 477.
38. Id at 480, 343 N.E.2d at 478.
39. The most recent case on this subject is Board of Educ. v. Murphy, 56 Ill. App. 3d 981,
372 N.E.2d 899 (1978). At issue/was whether the granting of a minimum number of sabbatical
leaves was arbitrable. The court stated:
According to the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois Education AssociationLocal Community High School District No. 218 v. Board of Education (1975), 62 Ill. 2d
127, 340 N.E.2d 7, and in Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers' Union
Local 1600 (1976) 62 III. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473, contractual provisions which limit or
delegate discretionary functions which are specifically imposed upon the Board of Edu-
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Mediation and Fact Finding
In addition to arbitration, an impasse may be resolved by media-
tion or fact finding. Mediation involves a third party who aids in the
settlement of an employment dispute by offering advice, but not by
making binding decisions, as is usually the case in arbitration. Fre-
quently, a mediator confers with each party to a dispute without re-
vealing how far the other is willing to go in compromising the dispute.
Using his powers of persuasion, the mediator attempts to bring the par-
ties to the point where they can reach agreement. Mediation can be
effective if it is done by a competent, experienced and unbiased labor
mediator. Unfortunately, there are too few such persons available.
Fact finding usually is conducted by individuals appointed to in-
vestigate and report the facts and clarify the issues, but who make no
recommendations for settlement of the dispute. Fact finding has been
used frequently in Illinois. Its success depends on the ability of the fact
finder to elicit the facts clearly and specifically, and the imposition of a
reasonable time limit upon his report.
One or two school districts in Illinois have experimented with a
variant of fact finding called "last best offer," wherein the fact finder is
precluded from compromising the parties' positions, but is compelled
to choose between them. The theory is that this compels the parties to
bargain much closer for fear of having the unreasonable position. The
fact finder may choose one party's position on the basis of the entire
contract, winner take all, or on an issue-by-issue basis. Experience with
this variation has not proved favorable to date.
Finally, a new approach to resolving an impasse which appears to
be gaining some acceptance, allows the voters the opportunity of solv-
ing the problem by a referendum vote. The City and County of San
Francisco, California adopted this approach in an election in Novem-
ber 1976, and voted against union demands in a negotiation impasse.
cation by the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 122), are unenforceable against the
Board.
... In Union Local 1600 the court held the Board of Education's power of faculty
promotions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 122, par. 103-42) is a nondelegable power which it
cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration, and a collective bargaining agreement so
providing would be an impermissible delegation of the Board's authority to grant or
deny promotions.
By the above interpretation of the School Code, the Board, as a matter of law, does
not have the power to delegate its discretionary duty to award sabbatical leaves. The
arbitrator's finding, therefore, that "the Board exercised its authority through the action
of the Sabbatical Leave Committee" is erroneous as a matter of law and should have
been reversed by the circuit court,
Id at 984-85, 372 N.E.2d at 901.
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Several other cities are experimenting with this approach.4°
STRIKES AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Many employees who believe that they receive inadequate wages
and benefits often will not accept a unilateral determination of com-
pensation by their employers. In an effort to coerce employers to rec-
ognize their employee associations and submit to bargaining over
employee wages and benefits, employees have increasingly resorted to
the remedy of a labor strike.
Most states still prohibit a strike by public employees, 4' but advo-
cacy for legislative change has increased steadily. Even where the right
to strike is recognized, some states have developed a distinction be-
tween essential services and those which do not threaten public health
or safety. Where public employee strikes are prohibited, the weapon of
strike nevertheless has been used often,42 but resulting settlements have
been achieved at a cost of bitterness and frustration.
In Illinois, it is clear that a strike by a public employee is illegal.
In the 1965 case of Board of Education v. Redding,43 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a strike of thirteen custodial employees of a
community unit school district was illegal and that picketing should
have been enjoined. The court stated:
Although this is a case of first impression in a reviewing court of this
jurisdiction, it is, so far as we can ascertain, the universal view that
there is no inherent right in municipal employees to strike against
their governmental employer, whether Federal, State, or a political
subdivision thereof, and that a strike of municipal employees for any
purpose is illegal.4"
The court also made clear that a state, without abridging the right
40. See Labor Law. Right ofPublic Employees to Strike or Engage in Work Stoppage, 37
A.L.R. 3d 1147 (1971).
41. Strikes or work stoppages by public officers or employees, both federal and state, are
almost universally prohibited by statute or judicial decision. Certain state statutes have been held
to grant the right to strike. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages was
clearly recognized at common law. Generally, attacks against the anti-strike rule on constitutional
grounds have been held to be without merit. Likewise, picketing, while an expression of free
speech, if it is in support of an illegal objective, is generally subject to restraint.
42. For example, in 1974, through 382 strikes, 1,404,200 man days were lost with 160,349
union members in the public sector. Through the first nine months of 1975, 21 percent of striking
American workers were government employees. In Illinois, from 1958 to 1974 there were 252
strikes, an average of 14.82 strikes per year, certainly well above the national average, on a state
by state basis, of 1.18 strikes per year. Would these figures change if Illinois enacted a public
bargaining law? Statistics seem to say emphatically no. For the same period, from 1958 to 1974,
in every state except Indiana, passage of a public bargaining law has resulted in increased strike
activity. PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES (2d ed. 1976).
43. 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Redding].
44. Id at 571, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
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of free speech, could restrain picketing where such curtailment was
necessary to protect the public interest and property rights, and where
the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. The Redding decision im-
mediately was heralded as settling the question of whether public em-
ployees have a right to strike and picket in support of such a strike.
The decision, however, did not solve the problem. Illegal strikes fol-
lowed, as well as new tactics, such as the withholding of services
through slowdown and wholesale cases of illnesses.
In two subsequent decisions, Peters v. South Carolina Community
Hospital45 and County of Peoria v. Benedict,46 the Illinois Supreme
Court seemed to back down from its strong language in Redding. In
those decisions, the court refused to declare strikes illegal and grant
injunctions against them in a not-for-profit hospital and a county-
owned nursing home.
In 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court clarified the confusion caused
by those decisions. In City of Pana v. Cro e, 4 7 the court reversed the
decision of an appellate court 48 that had reversed the granting of a tem-
porary injunction and a permanent injunction by the trial court. The
defendants were employees of the City of Pana and members of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The
defendants urged that the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act was applicable
and therefore the injunctions were improper.
In reversing the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that the history of the statute clearly indicated that it was not intended
to apply to work stoppages by governmental employees. The court re-
stated its position in Redding that a strike by governmental employees
is unlawful, noting that "[tihe doctrine that public employees have no
legal right to engage in a strike has been reiterated. ' '4
9
45. 44 IlL. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Peters]. The court in
Peters held that a strike by employees for a not-for-profit hospital was not contrary to public
policy and not subject to injunctive relief. The court, in seeking to distinguish Bedding, stated that
"it was the constitution that declared the public policy," id at 27, 253 N.E.2d at 378, whereas in
the Peters case there was no overriding expression of public policy. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (1976) made no exceptions
for hospitals. Id
46. 47 IlI. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Benedict]. The court in Benedict had to consider the applicability of the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act to a strike by employees of a county-owned and operated nursing home. The trial court's
preliminary injunction was held to have been erroneously issued. Even though the court held the
preliminary injunction erroneous, it nevertheless upheld the contempt order, noting that an in-
junction, while in force, would not be disregarded. Id at 170, 265 N.E.2d at 143. Most of the
court's opinion in the Benedict case deals with the contempt issue.
47. 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Crowe].
48. City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 II. App. 3d. 90, 299 N.E.2d 770 (1973).
49. 57 Ill. 2d at 550-51, 316 N.E.2d at 514-15 (citations omitted).
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The court then acknowledged the Benedict and Peters decisions,
noting that they involved strikes of employees of a not-for-profit com-
munity hospital and a nursing home and stated: "In our opinion
neither the Peters case nor the Benedict case requires that we depart in
this case from the longstanding rule that public employees have no
right to strike and that a strike by them is unlawful and therefore not
within the scope of the anti-injunction act." 50
In concluding its opinion, the court recognized that the Illinois
General Assembly had acquiesced in the conclusions of the court in
various decisions and had dealt with collective bargaining and arbitra-
tion in certain areas, such as firemen and Regional Transit Authority
employees, but had refused to interfere with the conclusion that a strike
of public employees was unlawful. Finally, the court stated that the
situation in a strike of public sector employees differs sharply from pri-
vate industry. It recognized that the functions provided by government
were of such a nature that there could be no substitution of products as
in the private sector.5 The court also recognized that strikes of public
employees were apt to create emergencies affecting the health, safety
and welfare of the public.5 2 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court hope-
fully has come full circle in reinforcing its decision in Redding,
However, neither the Redding nor the Crowe decision has stopped
teachers from striking. There are a number of options available to a
school district in the event that teachers or other employees decide to
strike. These include seeking an injunction, or, more drastically, seek-
ing the discharge of the striking employees.
An injunction can be sought by a school district to restrain its em-
ployees from any illegal activity, including picketing.5 3 If the employ-
ees deliberately violate a court injunction, then contempt proceedings
may follow with the possibility of fines and imprisonment.5 4 Even
where a preliminary injunction against a strike was wrongfully granted
by a trial court, fines for criminal contempt have been upheld.55 The
50. Id at 552, 316 N.E.2d at 515.
51. Id. at 553, 316 N.E.2d at 516.
52. Id.
53. In Board of Educ. v. Parkhill, 50 Ill. App. 3d 60, 365 N.E.2d 195 (1977), the trial court
granted a temporary restraining order against picketing and a school strike, but subsequently re-
fused to grant a permanent injunction and dismissed the temporary order. The appellate court
reversed and held that the picketing was for recognition, not for informational purposes, and,
where it was disruptive and interfered with and impeded governmental functioning, it should have
been enjoined. Id at 63, 365 N.E.2d at 197.
54. See Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264
N.E.2d 18, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1970).
55. In Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union Local 1600, 42 Il. App. 3d
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only alternative available to the employee who refuses to obey a court-
ordered injunction, short of possible fine or imprisonment, is to resign
his employment.
When confronted by a school district seeking an injunction, a trial
court may at times attempt to influence the labor process by acting as a
super mediator or arbitrator. However, one Illinois court recently indi-
cated that trial courts should avoid such meddling in the labor proc-
ess.56 The extent of the trial court's involvement should be to maintain
the status quo at the time the injunction is issued.
7
A school board also can seek to discharge striking employees.5 8 In
previous instances, Illinois courts have approved the dismissal of strik-
ing public employees.5 9 However, any action of dismissal must be
characterized by equal treatment toward the striking employees. For
example, in 0/shock v. Village of Skokie,60 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the
discharge of certain striking policemen was in violation of their consti-
tutional rights. The court's opinion clearly recognizes that such strikes
are illegal in Illinois. The problem as seen by the majority of the court
was the way in which the proceedings were handled before the Fire and
1056, 356 N.E.2d 1089 (1976), the court upheld fines for criminal contempt (although some of the
fines were reduced) even though the court found that the temporary restraining order should not
have been entered without notice or an adequate explanation of why notice was not given. The
trial court also failed to properly set down a hearing for a preliminary injunction and improperly
renewed the restraining order a few hours after it had expired by its own terms. Id. at 1063, 356
N.E.2d at 1094. The appellate court also pointed out that the law does not favor granting injunc-
tive orders without notice sufficient to afford the defendant an opportunity to show it should not
issue. Id at 1061, 356 N.E.2d at 1093. However, notwithstanding these errors by the trial judge,
the injunction must be obeyed until it is set aside, and these errors are not subject to attack in a
contempt proceeding. Id. at 1063, 356 N.E.2d at 1094.
56. In Harper College Faculty Senate v. Board of Trustees, 51 111. App. 3d 443, 366 N.E.2d
999 (1977), the union secured three injunctive orders where negotiations had stalled. The first two
orders restrained the board from communicating directly with the faculty or accepting individual
faculty contracts. The third order required the board to negotiate several hours a day, seven days
a week until the current agreement expired. The appellate court summarily reversed all three
orders. The court held that the trial court was "without jurisdiction or authority to force the
parties to bargain at all, much less on a forced basis such as the one here." Id at 446, 366 N.E.2d
at 1002.
57. Board of Educ. v. Springfield Educ. Ass'n, 47 Ill. App. 3d 193, 361 N.E.2d 697 (1977).
The trial court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining a strike after the expiration of a
contract but found that the contract constituted the status quo between the parties. The board of
education was restrained from maintaining a previously imposed salary freeze. The Appellate
Court for the Fourth District affirmed, emphasizing that the trial court has an obligation to im-
pose the status quo. Id at 196, 361 N.E.2d at 700.
58. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976),
for a procedure approved by the United States Supreme Court.
59. See Fletcher v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Ill. App. 3d 593, 286 N.E.2d 130 (1972).
60. 541 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Police Commission. 61 The court allowed back pay, less deductions for
a proportionate share of the damages to the village by the strikers.
While equal treatment must be accorded to the strikers, due proc-
ess may not be necessary unless state law requires it. In Illinois, the
Teachers Tenure Act 62 must be followed. In Lake Michigan College
Federation of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College,63 striking
teachers were dismissed for violating a Michigan statute prohibiting
public employees from striking.64 The court ruled that the require-
ments of due process as set down in Board of Regents v. Roth 65 were not
triggered because striking teachers had neither a liberty nor a property
interest. The court indicated that due process safeguards would only be
required "if the discharge of a teacher foreclosed future employment
opportunities that otherwise would be open to him or if the grounds for
the discharge tend to discredit the teacher's honesty or integrity or to
damage his standing in the community.
'66
In addition to seeking the discharge of striking employees, the
board of education should give serious consideration to terminating
any existing agreements and withdrawing recognition of the exclusive
bargaining agency, even where a contract may have expired by its own
terms. The board of education also should consider the possibility of a
damage action against the union and the employees. Obviously, a
strike will cause a large amount of additional expense, and 0/shock
seems to suggest that these damages are recoverable. 67 Indeed, various
contract and tort theories are available for consideration. Finally, it
may be practical in a strike situation for a school board to consider
posting notices on school property to prohibit striking employees from
entering upon it. By so doing, the board may be able to institute crimi-
nal trespass actions if strikers ignore the warnings.
68
61. As the court said: "The only discernable pattern of treatment of the 54 police officers
who were disciplined is that the 34 who were discharged appeared with an attorney and the 20
who were suspended appeared without an attorney." Id at 1258.
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1977).
63. 518 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1975).
64. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 423.202 (1976).
65. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
66. 518 F.2d at 1096.
67. See the Seventh Circuit's decision at 541 F.2d at 1260.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 21-3 (1977) provides:
(a) Whoever enters upon the land or any part thereof of another, after receiving, imme-
diately prior to such entry, notice from the owner or occupant that such entry is
forbidden, or remains upon the land of another after receiving notice from the own-
er or occupant to depart, commits a Class C misdemeanor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 21-5 (1977) provides:
(a) Whoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State funds, or Fed-
eral funds administered or granted through State agencies or any building on such
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THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
The selection of the negotiating team is extremely important. The
team should include someone from top management, as well as a de-
partment chairman. 69 Inclusion of a pro-management foreman might
be helpful in bargaining with non-certified personnel. The school at-
torney is usually on the team and is often the chief negotiator because
of his experience in such matters. On the other hand, board of educa-
tion members should not be negotiators. They should be kept one step
removed from the bargaining table so that they may maintain their per-
spective in considering the proposed contract in its entirety after pre-
liminary dialogue between the parties.
Complete and careful preparation is, of course, essential to the
success of the school district's negotiations. Management must be ade-
quately informed about such issues as cost/benefit relationships and
employee attitudes toward working conditions and board policies.
Before negotiations begin, the attorney for the school district should
review the present contract, 70 and confer with department supervisors
in order to determine the contract's effectiveness and weaknesses. Also
helpful would be a review of current grievances and employer-em-
ployee problems. Further, the attorney should examine the school dis-
trict's fiscal abilities, current wage schedules in private employment,
and recent arbitration decisions on the present contract.
Most important, the attorney should meet with the district admin-
istration and board of education to define the scope of authority of the
negotiating team. He must ensure the administration's support by in-
cluding them in the negotiating process as much as possible-by edu-
cating them in the process of negotiations and keeping them fully
informed.
Various preliminary matters should be considered before the initi-
land, after receiving, immediately prior to such entry, notice from the State or its
representative that such entry is forbidden, or remains upon such land or in such
building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and
who thereby interferes with another person's lawful use or enjoyment of such build-
ing or land, commits a Class A misdemeanor.
See also Op. Att'y Gen. 889 (1975).
69. As an example, the negotiating team might include the school district superintendent or
someone from his office, or an assistant superintendent or business manager, a principal and per-
haps a department chairman.
70. If it is contemplated that a re-negotiation of a present contract is in order, consider that
the community might be required to pay its employees pursuant to an expired contract. One
Illinois appellate court case recently so held, where a board of education sought an injunction to
prevent a work stoppage. The board was prohibited from imposing a salary freeze, as this would
not preserve the "status quo." See Board of Educ. v. Springfield Educ. Ass'n, 47 I11. App. 3d 193,
198, 361 N.E.2d 697, 701 (1977).
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ation of bargaining sessions. These include the scope of authority of
the chief negotiator vis-a-vis the other members of the bargaining team;
the times, places, and agendas of meetings; and the roles and involve-
ment of the press and the public.
7'
In negotiating an agreement, the school district team should accept
union proposals for study and future response.72 Some time then can
be devoted to a review of the proposals. Management can request that
the union rationalize and explain each of its proposals. In succeeding
sessions, management can decide either to deal strictly with the union
proposals or to present its own proposals. Often, presenting proposals
from management will help to clarify problem areas and introduce a
spirit of cooperative problem-solving to the negotiations. The manage-
ment negotiating team likewise should be prepared to explain and sup-
port their proposals. After the proposals are fully understood, then the
probing, questioning, debating and real bargaining begin.73
CONCLUSION
What is the forecast for future school employee contract negotia-
tions? At the 1978 Labor Management Relations Conference in Wash-
ington, D.C., the prediction was for tough negotiations emphasizing
wages and job security. Labor will have difficulty securing wage in-
creases beyond cost of living boosts. Public employers will be more
hardnosed and attempt to limit the cost of expensive benefits. Unions
will renew their efforts to organize and secure state legislation favoring
collective bargaining and the right to strike. Some unions will press for
the right to strike, while others will emphasize grievance binding arbi-
tration.
74
The idea of relating benefits to increased worker productivity has
71. Experimental opening of these sessions to the public and the press has not been success-
ful. The nature of the process of negotiations requires open and frank discussion and not playing
to the press. Indeed, negotiations have proven to be most successful where publicity on the pro-
gress is severely limited. Sometimes, where the union membership is large, the union team will
seek permission to disseminate progress to their membership, but this too should be restricted as
much as possible.
72. It is important at this stage to establish a ground rule that all union proposals must be
made first and must be complete when submitted. Negotiations can never come to an end if new
proposals can be placed on the table at any time during negotiations. The reason for requiring the
union proposal first is that management, before negotiating, possesses all of the powers and au-
thority. Union proposals must, of necessity, take some of those powers away.
73. It is recommended that each session should be recorded by general notes or minutes.
74. See LMRS Newsletter (February 1978). Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, is quoted
extensively in the new publication, NLC - SPEER, National League of Cities (January 1978).
Wurf admits that the productivity and accountability among some public employees is not satis-
factory, but he blames public managers who don't manage properly.
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been gaining support in the last several years. This author believes that
the issue of productivity, its management and implementation, will be
one of the major thrusts by public employers during the next several
years. Methods will have to be developed that will provide more gov-
ernmental services at reduced cost. The taxpayers are crying out for
this type of response from all levels of government, and in particular at
the local level, including the schools. A well-informed board of educa-
tion, educated in the field of labor relations, will greatly aid in achiev-
ing this desirable result.

